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Most research concentrating on family and non-family businesses with firm
performance is conducted overseas with little research actually taking place
in Malaysia. Thus, this study focuses on the relationship between family
controlled businesses and corporate governance mechanisms with firm value
among Malaysian companies. The sample size of this study is 896 companies
that were listed on Bursa Malaysia from 2000 to 2003. The findings reveal
that corporate governance mechanisms do have an influence on firm value in
Malaysia. However, not all elements of governance mechanisms are significant,
and the effects differ between family-businesses and non-family businesses.
The results indicate as expected that board size and leadership structure
affect the firm value for all companies. Further analysis shows that family
businesses do practice separate leadership structure whilst board size
contributes positively towards better performance in non-family companies.
More importantly, family and non-family businesses are different in terms of
corporate governance practices. Thus, regulators need to give additional
attention to the unique setting of the family companies.
Keywords: Corporate governance, family business, firm value, Malaysia.
Introduction
The existence of family controlled firms is evident in Europe, Canada, Australia,
US, and East Asian countries including Malaysia (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986;
Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1988; Zingales, 1994; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer & Vishny, 1998; Claessens, Djankov & Lang, 2000; Smith & Amoako-
Adu, 1999). In the East Asian countries, the family controlled firms showed a
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unique trend of corporate ownership compared to non-family controlled firms
(La Porta et al., 1998). The distinguishing feature of the family controlled firms
may, to a certain extent, affect their firm performance as claimed in past studies.
A study found that about 70% of Malaysian companies are family controlled
firms (Claessens, Djankov & Lang, 2000). Family firms also form an essential
part of the Malaysian economy and contribute more than half of Malaysia’s
Gross Domestic Product (Ngui, 2002). A survey by Grant Thornton (2002) found
that Malaysian family firms evolved from small enterprises and became giant
conglomerates. A study by Ibrahim, Samad and Azmi (2008) evidenced that on
average, family ownership experiences a higher firm value than non-family
ownership.
Studies abroad have documented that family controlled firms were more
valuable and enjoyed improvement in firm performance relative to non-family
firms (McConaughy, Walker, Henderson & Mishra, 1998). Claessens, Djankov
and Lang (2000) further reported that significant corporate wealth in East Asian
countries was found to be concentrated among a few families. Such ownership
concentration also took place even among the largest American corporations
(Morck et al., 1988). In contrast, a study by Lauterbach and Vaninsky (1999) in
Israel indicated that family controlled firms had poor performance compared to
non-family controlled firms. The inconsistent results concerning family controlled
firms and performance, as discussed by previous studies, provides an avenue
for researchers to carry out this study in Malaysia. This study is different from
previous study (Mishra, Randoy & Jenssen, 2001) in two dimensions. First,
this study replicates the study by Mishra et al. (2001), but uses a panel data
approach to analyse the Malaysian data. Next, there is no published study in
Malaysia that compares family and non-family firms’ performance. Thus, these
factors motivate the researchers to carry out this study.
The problem statement of this study is that even though family firms
contribute greatly to the Malaysian economy, family firms are found to lack
independence and internal control. The board of most family firms consists of
family members. So, indirectly the composition of family members on the board
may affect firm performance. Moreover, family firms’ strategies used to be different
from non-family firms (Daily & Dollinger, 1991). This factor may also lead to
different performance between family and non-family firms. Special attention is
needed for family firms as family controlled businesses are very much governed
by family traits, which do not exist in other businesses (Mishra et al., 2001).
The objective of this study is to investigate the relationship between family
controlled businesses and firm value among Malaysian public listed companies.
In addition, the attributes of governance mechanisms in family controlled
business are examined.
In terms of the contribution of this study, studies relating to family business
and corporate governance are still new and few in the Malaysian setting. Thus,
by conducting this study, it is hoped that findings from this study can enhance
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the body of knowledge concerning the corporate governance area and
Malaysian family controlled firms. This study may also provide useful
information to regulators, investors and the public at large on the situation of
family controlled firms in Malaysia.
The presentation format of this study is as follows. First, the theoretical
framework on family businesses, firm value and corporate governance
mechanisms will be deliberated in the literature review section. The research
methodology is then explained. Then the research findings and discussion are
presented. Finally, research findings are summarized followed by limitations of
the study and recommendations for future study is made.
Review of Literature
Family Businesses and Firm Value
Studies have been carried out relating to the performance of the family and non-
family firms (Daily & Dollinger, 1991; McConaughy et al., 1998; Anderson &
Reeb, 2003; Miller & Breton-Miller, 2006; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). However,
there were mixed findings. A study by Daily and Dollinger (1991) reported
higher sales growth and a greater improvement in net margins for family firms
compared to non-family firms. McConaughy et al. (1998) examined differences
in efficiency and value, depending on whether the organization was a founding
family controlled firm (FFCF) and had a CEO as the founder or a descendant of
the founder, or was a non-FFCF (NFFCF). The findings reveal that FFCFs are
more efficient and valuable than NFFCFs with respect to industry, size and
managerial ownership. McConaughy, Matthews and Fialko’s (2001) findings
showed a higher market to book equity ratio for family firms compared to their
non-family counterparts. The study also revealed firms that are family controlled
by the founding family have greater value, operate more efficiently and carry
less debt than other firms.
Next, a study by Anderson and Reeb (2003) evidenced that family firms
have a higher Tobin’s Q and return on assets. Family ownership creates value
only when the founder serves as the CEO of the family firm or as Chairman with
a hired CEO (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Miller and Breton-Miller (2006) noted
that family firms performed better than non-family firms when the family firms
have the intention to keep the business for the next generation. Research by
Maury (2006) found that active family control continues to outperform non-
family control in terms of profitability in different legal regimes. Another study
conducted in Chile found that public family firms perform better than public
non-family firms (Martinez, Stohr & Quiroga, 2007).
In contrast, studies evidenced that performance of family firms is poorer
than their non-family counterparts. For example, a study by Lauterbach and
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Vanisky (1999) in Israel evidenced that family firms run by their owners perform
worse than non-family firms. Barclay and Holderness (1989) note that large
ownership stakes also reduce the probability of bidding by other agents, thereby
reducing the value of the firm. Another factor that diminishes a firm’s performance
is where large shareholders remain active in management although they are no
longer competent or qualified to run the firm. The implication is that firm
performance for older family firms is even worse relative to non-family firms
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).
The agency theory views that family firms have several incentives to reduce
agency costs (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Anderson & Reeb,
2003). First, as family firms have concentrated shareholdings, they have an
increased incentive to reduce agency costs because “the more concentrated
ownership is, the greater the degree to which the benefits and costs are borne
by the same owner” (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). Specifically, because the family’s
wealth is so closely linked to the firm’s welfare, families may have strong
incentives to monitor managers and minimize the free-rider problem inherent
with small, atomistic shareholders.
Meanwhile, the stewardship theory claims that managers are essentially
trustworthy individuals and good stewards of the resources. Since executive
directors spend their working lives in the firm they govern, they understand the
firms better than outside directors, so they can make superior decisions (Donaldson
& Davis, 1991, 1994). Proponents of the stewardship theory contend that superior
corporate performance will be linked to a majority of inside directors as they
naturally work to minimise profit for shareholders. The stewardship theory
perceives that managers are naturally trustworthy (Donaldson & Davis, 1991).
The agency costs will be minimized, as senior executives are unlikely to
disadvantage shareholders for fear of jeopardising their reputations. Furthermore,
stewardship philosophy has been practised and is common among successful
family firms. It has been proposed that the keen involvement encouraged by the
stewardship philosophy creates a sense of psychological ownership that motivates
the family to behave in the best interests of the firm (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004).
Based on the literature discussed, we therefore hypothesize that:
H1: There is a significant difference in firm value between family controlled
businesses and non-family controlled businesses.
Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Firm Value
Corporate governance mechanisms are designed to reduce agency costs associated
with the separation of ownership and control (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama &
Jensen, 1983). It was evidenced in previous studies that governance mechanisms,
to a certain extent, enhance firm value (Weir, Laing & McKnight, 2002). Yet little is
known about governance structures when family firms are predominant. In this
study, the researchers focus on the internal governance mechanisms.
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Board Independence
The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (2001) suggests that the principle
of ‘Board Balance’ requires that at least one third of the Board members are
Non-Executive Independent Directors1. The composition of the Board must
have at least two independent directors or one third of the Board, whichever is
higher. Previous studies (Rosentein & Wyatt, 1990;, Byrd & Hickman, 1992;
Cotter, Shivdasani & Zenner, 1997) found that independent non-executive
directors improve board performance and firm value. A study by Abdullah
(2001) on Malaysian firms evidenced that the board of directors were largely
dominated by non-executive directors.
In contrast, Booth and Deli (1996) found a negative relationship between
the number of independent non-executive directors and a firm’s growth
prospects. Subrahmanyam, Rangan and Rosenstein (1997) supported the
argument by revealing that firm performance reduced when more independent
non-executive directors serve the board. It is therefore posited that:
H2: Businesses with higher board independence outperform businesses with
lower board independence.
Family firms tend to have less independent directors. Hillman and Dalziel
(2003) have conducted a study on the board composition in family firms. They
evidenced that a board is independent when there is a significant proportion of
independent non-executive directors. Boards should comprise a substantial
majority of “independent” directors, that is, directors who are free from
commercial or personal ties that could impair their ability to probe and challenge
management (Felton & Watson, 2002). Furthermore, family companies that
participate in Bursa Malaysia have to comply with the listing requirements of
Bursa Malaysia in terms of board independence. It is likely that these
requirements could lead to better corporate governance in family firms. Hence,
it is expected that:
H2a: Family controlled businesses with higher board independence outperform
family controlled businesses with lower board independence.
Studies have found that independent non-executive directors improved
board performance and firm value (Rosentein & Wyatt, 1990; Byrd & Hickman,
1992; Cotter, Shivdasani & Zenner, 1997; Abdullah, 2001). The Code (2001) also
suggests that the principle of ‘Board Balance’ requires that at least one third of
the Board members are Non-Executive Independent Directors2. Based on the
aforementioned discussion, we hypothesize that:
H2b: Non-family controlled businesses with higher board independence
outperform non-family controlled businesses with lower board
independence.
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Board Size
Yermack (1996) reported that businesses with small board size have higher
stock market value. The result confirmed the findings by Jensen (1993) who
claimed that small board size could increase firm performance. However, Lipton
and Lorsch (1992) evidenced that too many executives on the board could
create more problems. Based on this premise, we hypothesize that:
H3: Businesses with smaller board size outperform businesses with larger
board size.
Family firms used to have a smaller board size (Ward, 1991; Cromie,
Stephenson & Montieth, 1995). A study by Bennedsen, Kongsted and Nielsen
(2008) found that family firms have a negative effect when the size of the boards
increases to six or more members. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H3a: Family controlled businesses with smaller board size outperform family
controlled businesses with larger board size.
Findings by Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) evidenced that small board
size could increase firm performance. Usually the board size is between seven
to eight executives on the board, in order to ensure firm effectiveness. The
following hypothesis is thus stated:
H3b: Non-family controlled businesses with smaller board size outperform non-
family controlled businesses with larger board size.
Leadership Structure
Businesses usually practice either separate or duality leadership structure.
Separate leadership happens when two different individuals hold the positions
of chairman and CEO. Duality leadership takes place when one person holds
both positions of chairman and CEO. Separate leadership is claimed to curb
agency problems and enhance firm performance (Fama & Jensen, 1983) and
consistently outperform businesses with duality leadership structure (Rechner
& Dalton, 1991; Fosberg & Nelson, 1999).
A study by Abdullah (2001) found that 78.6% of Malaysian firms have a
separate leadership structure. A survey conducted by Price Waterhouse Coopers
(1999) showed that the majority of Malaysian public listed companies separate
the roles of board chairman and CEO. About 89% of the firms exercise separate
leadership (Ayoib, Nor Aziah & Zuaini, 2003). Abdul Rahman and Mohd Haniffa
(2005) evidenced that there is an increasing trend of CEO-duality in Malaysia,
from 8.8% in 1996 to about 17.9% in 1999. The results also show that firms with
CEO-duality appear not to perform as well as their counter parts with a separate
board. Next, a research conducted on the top 150 public listed companies in
Malaysia found that governance practices such as adopting concentrated
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ownership and CEO-duality affect firm performance of Malaysian companies
(Tam & Tan, 2007). Based on the literature, we hypothesize that:
H4: Businesses with separate leadership outperform businesses that practice
duality leadership.
Donaldson and Davis (1991) argued that, for CEOs who are stewards, their
pro-organizational actions are best facilitated when the corporate governance
structures give them high authority and discretion (Felton & Watson, 2002).
Structurally, this situation is attained if the CEO chairs the board of directors.
Thus, this leads to the following hypothesis:
H4a: Family controlled businesses with separate leadership outperform family
controlled businesses that practice duality leadership.
There are a lot of studies conducted in Malaysia in relation to leadership
structure. A study by researchers (Abdullah, 2001; Ayoib et al., 2003; Abdul
Rahman & Mohd Haniffa, 2005; Tam & Tan, 2007) found that companies that
practice separate leadership structure may have better firm performance.
Therefore, based on the arguments above, it is hypothesized that:
H4b: Non-family controlled businesses with separate leadership outperform
non-family controlled businesses that practice duality leadership.
CEO Tenure
If monitoring requires knowledge of business’ technology, families potentially
provide superior oversight because their lengthy tenure permits them to move
further along the business’ learning curve. Anderson and Reeb (2003) suggested
that businesses with continued founding-family presence exhibit significantly
better accounting and market performance than non-family businesses.
Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2003) further supported that the family’s sustained
presence in the business also creates powerful reputation effects that provide
incentives for family managers to improve business performance.
Johnson, Magee, Nagarajan and Newman (1985) and Morck et al. (1988),
however, suggested that founder CEOs are associated with strong performance
only at the early stage of their careers, but poorer performance in later years,
and that family member CEOs are more entrenched in their positions. A study
by Schulze, Dino, Lubatkin and Buchholtz (1999) noted that placing family
members as CEO could lead to resentment on the part of senior non-family
executives because tenure, merit, and talent are not necessarily requisite skills
for top management positions. Based on the literature, we therefore hypothesize
that:
H5: Businesses with longer CEO tenure outperform businesses with shorter
CEO tenure.
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Research Method
The data, research model and discussion on variables are discussed in this
section.
Data
This study uses panel data for companies listed on Bursa Malaysia over the
period 2000 to 2003. Previously, studies (Abdullah, 2001; Ayoib et al., 2003;
Abdul Rahman & Haniffa, 2005) look at the data before the implementation of
The Code (2001). However, this study relooks at The Code (2001) and used data
before and after the implementation of The Code (2001), so that comparison can
be made with past studies. Panel data is more informative compared to cross-
sectional based regression as this may avoid certain assumptions promulgated
by regression analysis (Greene, 2008). Given the population size of 906
businesses listed on Bursa Malaysia, as at 31 March 2004, the suggested sample
size was 380 businesses (Sekaran, 2004). Data was hand collected by referring
to the annual reports and the KLSE annual handbook.
Research Model
The model used in this study replicates the previous study by Mishra et al.
(2001). Several statistical methods were used to analyse the data. First, we used
descriptive analysis to examine the nature of family businesses. Second, the
correlation matrix was carried out to evidence the relationship between the
independent variables. Third, the t-test was adopted to reveal the differences
between family controlled businesses and non-family controlled businesses.
Fourth, a regression analysis was conducted to observe the factors influencing
the firm value of family controlled businesses based on the following model
(Mishra et al., 2001):
Qit = α + β1itFC + β2itBI + β3itBS + β4itLS + β5itCEOTen + β6itFS + β7itFA +
β8itSG + β9itLV + β10itROA + β11it AT + vi + εit
Where:
Qit = Natural log of the firm value
FC = Family controlled firm
BI = Board independence
BS = Board size
LS = Leadership structure
CEOTen = CEO tenure
FS = Firm size
FA = Firm age
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SG = Sales growth
LV = Leverage
ROA = Return on assets
AT = Asset tangibility
β1-β11 = Regression coefficients
vi = Specific error
eit = Idiosyncratic error
Variable Measurement
Following the previous research (Mishra et al., 2001), this study explains the
measurement used for the dependent and independent variables.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is the firm value (measured by the q-value and is defined
as the ratio of market value of the firm to the book value of total assets). The q-
value is an approximation of Tobin’s Q (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell & Servaes,
1990; Chung & Pruitt, 1994; Perfect & Wiles, 1994; Yermack, 1996; Yeh, Lee &
Woidtke, 2001; Mishra et al., 2001 & Weir et al., 2002). Tobin’s Q measurement
is accepted as a better measure of firm performance (Mayer, 2003) as it reflects
the market performance measure rather than the accounting performance measure.
Hypothesis Variables
A family controlled firm is defined as where one of the following three criteria is
met: (1) if the CEO is the founder/successor or a relative of the founder, (2) if
there is a presence of founding family members on the board, or (3) if the family
control at least 10% of all shares, in which case it is coded as 1, otherwise 0
(Mishra et al., 2001). Board independence is measured by the proportion of
independent non-executive directors to total board composition (Barnhart &
Rosenstein, 1998). Then, board independence is split into high board
independence (> 0.33) and coded as 1, low board independence (< 0.33) is
coded as 0. The value 0.33 (is equivalent to required 1/3 of the non-executive
directors being independent) is in line with the The Code (2001). Board size
refers to the number of directors on the board (Mishra et al., 2001). The board is
divided into high board size (> 8, which is coded as 1 and low board size (< = 8),
which is coded as 0 (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). Leadership structure is
measured using a binary variable with businesses having separate leadership
coded as 1, otherwise 0 (Zajac & Westphal, 1996). CEO tenure is measured as
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the number of years the current CEO has held the post (Anderson & Reeb,
2003).
Control Variables
In this study, control variables are included and are kept constant to minimize
their effects on the outcome. Variables that are included in this study are:
a. Firm size is measured as a logarithm to the base of 10 of total assets
(McConaughy et al., 1998; Mishra et al., 2001).
b. Firm age is the logarithm difference between the end of year 2003 and the
firm’s founding year (McConaughy et al., 1998; Mishra et al., 2001).
c. Sales growth is measured by taking the difference of turnover between the
current year and the preceding year and divided by the turnover in the
preceding year base. The total amounts were converted into logarithms
(McConaughy et al., 1998; Mishra et al., 2001).
d. Leverage is measured as the proportion of total liabilities to total assets
(Murphy, 1968; Robichek & Myres, 1965).
e. Return on assets is the profit (before interest and tax) to total assets (James,
1999).
f. Asset tangibility is measured as proportion of tangible assets to total
assets (Casson, 1999).
g. CEO tenure is measured as the number of years the current CEO held the
post (Anderson & Reeb, 2003).
Results and Discussion
Descriptive Analysis
The final sample consists of 896 businesses from year 2000 until 2003 after
excluding businesses with incomplete data and PN4 (suspended from operation)
businesses.
Table 1: Sample Selection Process
Number of companies listed from 2000 to 2003 1520
Less: Incomplete data 540
Less: PN4 companies 84
Final sample 896
Pearson correlation coefficients were computed and are exhibited in
Table 2. It appears that there is no significant correlation between family
controlled businesses with firm value. Results show that Malaysian family
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firms have a lower firm value than non-family firms. However, it is reported that
family controlled businesses have a significant positive correlation with
leadership structure and CEO tenure. This is consistent with study by Anderson
and Reeb (2003). It indicates that a CEO with a powerful reputation has a longer
tenureship, which indirectly helps family firms improve performance. Also firms
with founding family present exhibit better firm value.
Table 2: Correlation Matrix




BI -.001 - 1
.226***
BS .077 -.011 .116* 1
**
LS .034 .261*** - - 1
.076* .178
* ***
CEOTEN -.003 .258*** - .028 .141* 1
.114* **
**
FS -.092*** - .155* .386 - .052 1
.131*** ** *** .122*
**
FA .021 - .201* .012 - .214* .306** 1
.185*** ** .066** ** *
*
SG .012 .054 .014 .073 .002 .033 .104** .005 1
** *
LEV .096*** -.026 .006 .119 -.015 .008 -.064 .003 -.008 1
***
ROA .113*** -.028 .006 .123 -.019 .005 - -.006 -.002 .997*** 1
*** .078**
AT .086*** -.007 .005 .110 .001 .016 -.039 .002 .016 .845*** .843* 1
*** **
*** Significant at 1% level (two-tailed)
** Significant at 5% level (two-tailed)
* Significant at 10% level (two-tailed)
Q = Firm Value FS = Firm Size
FCB = Family Controlled Business FA = Firm Age
BI = Board Independence SG = Sales Growth
BS = Board Size LEV = Leverage
LS = Leadership Structure ROA = Return on Assets
CEOTEN = CEO Tenure AT = Asset Tangibility
In contrast, family controlled businesses are found to have a negative
relationship with firm size, firm age and board independence. The justification
for such a relationship could be supported by Chami (1997) who claimed family
controlled businesses tend to be smaller than public corporations. In terms of
board independence, the result is in line with studies by Booth and Deli (1996)
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and Subrahmanyam, Rangan and Rosenstein (1997) who claimed that firm
performance reduced when more independent non executive directors serve on
the board. It means that the executive directors are more active in playing their
roles in managing the board. Results also revealed that leverage, ROA and
asset tangibility are highly correlated. Thus, each variable (LV, AT and ROA)
was tested one at a time. However, the results are identical in terms of statistical
significance signs. Thus, it shows that the correlations do not affect the analysis.
This indicates that assets and leverage are highly used in managing the business.
Univariate Test Analysis
Based on the t-test results in Table 3, there is a difference in the mean of Q
between family controlled businesses and non-family controlled businesses,
but not significant. The results of family controlled businesses and non-family
controlled businesses, which use the alternative definitions (i.e. dummy
variables), are similar in terms of the significant levels of the hypotheses
variables. Hence, the results are robust.
In terms of corporate governance attributes, the family controlled businesses
have higher means of leadership structure and CEO tenure but a lower mean for
board independence. The possible explanation for such effects is that family
firms also favour adopting separate leadership as recommended by The Code
(2001). Thus by practicing good governance, firm value may be enhanced.
Similarly, the positive effects of CEO tenure on family controlled businesses
have also been documented by previous studies (Morck et al.,1988; Anderson
et al., 2003; Anderson & Reeb, 2003). They unanimously agreed that a lengthy
CEO tenure would enhance the businesses’ value. The CEOs powerful reputation
may increase firm performance. However, board independence is negatively
related with performance. A higher number of independent non-executive
directors do not enhance firm value. This result contradicts The Code (2001),
but supported other studies (Booth & Deli, 1996; Subrahmanyam, Rangan &
Rosenstein, 1997).
Family businesses appear to have a negative relationship with firm size
and firm age. This result is in line with a study by Kang (1998), who documented
that early generation family owners are associated with higher performance
than their descendants. Also as the firms get larger, it is more complex to manage,
so firm value decreases.
In terms of sector, results reveal that family firms that involved in consumer
products, constructions and infrastructure projects do enhance firm value, but
trading services sector has a decreasing firm value. While other sectors such as
hotels, properties and plantations do not show any effect with firm value.
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Panel Data Regression Analysis
To further test the relationship between firm value and family controlled
businesses, the regression analysis was employed using the regression model
n.a. = not applicable
Q = Firm Value
FCB = Family Controlled Business
BI = Board Independence
BS = Board Size
LS = Leadership Structure
CEOTen = CEO Tenure
FS = Firm Size
FA = Firm Age
SG = Sales Growth
LEV = Leverage
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Family Controlled Businesses (FCBs)
and Non-Family Controlled Businesses (NFCBs)
FULL SAMPLE FCB NFCB
(n = 896) (n = 335) (n = 561)
Variables Mean SD Mean Mean t-value
Q .646 .688 .642 .649 -.135
FCB .37 .484 n.a. n.a. n.a.
BI .548 .256 .474 .593 -6.944***
BS .885 .117 .883 .886 -.344
LS .15 .358 .27 .08 8.095***
CEOTEN 8.03 7.497 10.53 6.53 7.997***
FS 8.635 .588 8.535 8.694 -3.95***
FA 3.800 .327 3.722 3.846 -5.615***
SG .081 .392 .108 .065 1.607
LEV 1.478 30.08 .452 2.089 -.788
ROA .918 7.706 .641 1.083 -.831
AT .394 .548 .383 .397 -.231
ALL 4.04 2.701 3.64 4.28 -3.432***
CP .156 .363 .197 .132 2.604***
IP .255 .436 .275 .242 1.07
CON .098 .298 .146 .007 3.76***
TS .223 .417 .149 .267 -4.143***
INFRA .009 .094 .024 .000 3.701***
HOTEL .013 .115 .012 .014 -.292
PROP .17 .376 .14 .187 -1.81
PLANT .076 .265 .057 .087 -1.676
*** Significant at 1% level (two-tailed)
** Significant at 5% level (two-tailed)
* Significant at 10% level (two-tailed)
ROA = Return on Assets
AT = Asset Tangibility
ALL = All Industries
CP = Consumer Product
I P = Industrial Product
CON = Construction
TS = Trading Services
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as discussed in the Research Model section. In each regression, this study
controls three sets of variables consisting of six financial characteristics (firm
size, sales growth, financial leverage, return on assets, asset tangibility and firm
age), four corporate governance characteristics (board size, board independence,
leadership structure and CEO tenure) and eight dummy variables representing
the eight industry groups.
In this study, the panel data approach has been applied because this method
is able to control the impact of omitted variables. By using panel data, the
information on both the intertemporal dynamics and the individuality of the
entities may allow one to control the effects of missing or unobserved variables
(Hsiao, 2003). The Hausman test was carried out to determine whether the Fixed
Effect Model (FEM) or the Random Effect Model (REM) is more appropriate in
this study (Greene, 2008). As the p value of the Hausman test was significant,
from the F-statistic, we concluded that the FEM is more suitable for this study.
Table 4 reveals the findings for the hypotheses H1 to H5. The results
supported H3 and H4 for both models OLS and FEM. Board size and leadership
structure variables are significant, and support the theories of the study. The
findings on the board size indicate that smaller board size is preferred, which is
in line with a study carried out by Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) that claimed
small board size could enhance firm value. For leadership structure, firms that
practised separate leadership structure are better off than firms that practiced
duality leadership. This finding supported previous studies (Fama & Jensen,
1983; Abdullah, 2001; Ayoib et al., 2003; Abdul Rahman & Mohd Haniffa, 2005).
Furthermore, variables INFRA and HOTEL have been dropped from the OLS
and FEM models due to small observations. The control variables (firm size and
leverage) are negatively related with firm performance, while ROA shows a
positive relationship with firm performance for OLS and FEM models.
Table 5 reports the findings for the sub-hypotheses H2a to H4b, which have
been discussed earlier in the literature review section (FCB and NFCB). The
results only supported H3b and H4a. The results supported H3b where non-family
controlled businesses with smaller board size outperform non-family controlled
businesses with larger board size. This result supported previous studies
(Yermack, 1996; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992), which evidenced that small board size
may increase firm performance as they are easier to administer and more effective
in controlling the ideas of board members, but in contrast with studies by
Chami (1997) and Daily and Dollinger (1991). The test also supports H4a where
family controlled businesses that practise separate leadership outperform family
controlled businesses with duality leadership. This result is consistent with
previous studies (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Morck et al., 1988; Rechner & Dalton,
1991; Fosberg & Nelson, 1999; Abdullah, 2001, Ayoib et. al., 2003; Abdul Rahman
& Mohd Haniffa, 2005) that claimed separate leadership could enhance firm
performance.
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Table 4: Panel Data Regression Results for H1 to H5 (n = 896)
OLS Fixed-effect
Coef. t Coef. t
FCB (H1) -.006 -.17 .073 .15
BI (H2) -.067 -.60 .237 1.64
BS (H3) .674 3.17*** .679 2.91***
LS (H4) .116 1.87* .162 2.38***
CEOTEN (H5) -.001 -.31 .002 .42
FS -.114 -2.46*** -.292 -4.91***
FA .162 1.83* .161 1.52
SG .004 .06 .001 .02
LEV -.067 -4.2*** -.058 -4.52***
ROA .274 4.4*** .230 4.6***
AT -.047 -.56 .069 .95
CP .057 .64 -.478 -2.26**
IP -.019 -.25 -.290 -1.42
CON -.051 -.57 -.330 -1.52
TS .054 .66 -.128 -.62
PROP -.045 -.56 -.279 -1.37
PLANT .191 2.03** -.097 -.43
CONSTANT .302 .58 1.872 3.16***
Adj.R2 .093 .1709
*** Significant at 1% level (two-tailed)
** Significant at 5% level (two-tailed)
* Significant at 10% level (two-tailed)
FCB = Family Controlled Business
BI = Board Independence
BS = Board Size
LS = Leadership Structure
CEOTen = CEO Tenure
FS = Firm Size
FA = Firm Age
SG = Sales Growth
LV = Leverage
ROA = Return on Assets
AT = Asset Tangibility
ALL = All Industries
CP = Consumer Product
I P = Industrial Product
CON = Construction




Overall, this study aims to investigate the relationship of family controlled
businesses and corporate governance mechanisms with firm value. The results
provide empirical evidence that small board size is better than large board size.
Moreover, a separate leadership structure is better than duality leadership, for
all samples. When firms are split into family and non-family firms, results show
that non-family businesses with smaller board size outperform non-family
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businesses with larger board size. The results also reveal that family controlled
businesses that practice separate leadership perform better than family controlled
businesses with duality leadership. In other words, based on the results, we
can conclude that family and non-family businesses are different in terms of
corporate governance practices. This study has shown that family businesses
need to be treated differently from non-family businesses due to the different
nature of the firms, which rely on an internal control system and have a high
sense of familiness. Therefore, regulators also need to pay more attention to
the unique setting of family companies.
Limitations of the Study
The limitations of the study are that the sample focused on the companies
listed on Bursa Malaysia. Therefore, the results must be interpreted with care
since they cannot be generalized to the whole population. This is because non-
listed companies do have a smaller firm size compared to listed companies.
Perhaps, future research may include the second board and the time period may
be extended to five years. In terms of the model, future research should
reconsider whether to include the variables leverage, asset tangibility and ROA,
since these variables are highly correlated.
Table 5: Regression Results Sub-Hypotheses H2a-H4b for FCB
and NFCB (n =  896)
Variables Coef. t
Family controlled businesses with higher and -0.051 -0.178
lower board independence (H2a).
Non-family controlled businesses with higher 0.219 1.053
and lower board independence (H2b).
Family controlled businesses with smaller and 0.360 0.813
larger board size (H3a).
Non-family controlled firm with smaller and 0.473 1.176*
larger board size (H3b).
Family controlled businesses that practice duality -0.277 -1.777*
and unitary leadership (H4a).
Non-family controlled businesses that -0.047 -0.245
practice duality and unitary leadership (H4b).
*** Significant at 1% level (two-tailed)
** Significant at 5% level (two-tailed)
* Significant at 10% level (two-tailed)
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Endnotes
1 Directors that are not officers of the company; who are neither related to its
officers nor represent concentrated or family holdings of its shares.
2 Directors that are not officers of the company; who are neither related to its
officers nor represent concentrated or family holdings of its shares.
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